Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986)
Uncertaintiy of the Transition
“…unpredictability of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequeate information, of actors facing irresolvable ethical dilemmas and ideological confusions… [its] a theory of “abnormality”” (3-4).
“When studying an established political regime, one can rely on relatively stable economic, social, cultural, and partisan categories to identify, analyze, and evaluate the identities and strategies of those defending the status quo and those struggling to reform or transform it. We believe that this “normal science methodology” is inappropriate in rapidly changing situations, where those very parameters of political action are in flux.” (4).
“During these transitions, in many cases and around many themes, it is almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative.” (4).
“High degree of indeterminacy” (5): “The short-term political calculations we stress here cannot be “deduced” from or “imputed” to such structures –except perhaps in an act of misguided faith.” (5).
Defining some concepts * Also see my definitions page http://thecomparativepoliticsblog.blogspot.com/p/definitions.html
Transition "the interval between one political regime and another... Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return of some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pg 6). *Although it is not part of their definition, there are a few addendums that O&S make that should be kept in mind "It is characteristic of the transition that during it the rules of the political game are not defined" (pg 6) "The typical sign that the transition has begun comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups" (pg 6)
Liberalization: “The process of redefining and extending rights we have labeled “liberalization”. “…such movements have the effect of lowering the costs –real and anticipated- of individual expression and collective action. This, in turn, has a multiplier effect.” “…progressions in these domains [are not] irreversible…a characteristic of this early stage in the transition is its precarious dependence upon governmental power, which remains arbitrary and capricious.” (7).
Democratization: “What specific form democracy will take in a given country is a contingent matter…” (8)
Democratization "the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previous subject to citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.)" (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pg 8). (8) Also: “Nor democratization is irreversible.”
“If liberalization begins the transition, then we can locate the terminus ad quo of our inquiry at the moment that authoritarian rulers…announce their intention to extend significantly the sphere of protected individual and group rights…the intention of liberalizing must be sufficiently credible to provoke a change in the strategies of other actors.” (10-11).
Opening authoritarian regimes
“Hard-liners” and “soft-liners”: two groups in the authoritarian regime. The SL are “indistinguishable from the hard-liners in the first, “reactive” phase of the authoritarian regime…What turns them into SL is their increasing awareness that…the regime cannot wait too long before reintroducing certain freedoms.” (16).
“The most favorable occasions for attempting liberalization come at periods of widely acknowledged success of the authoritarian regime, including a high economic conjuncture, in which the soft-liners hope that the regime´s effectiveness will be transferred into popular support for the regime during the transition. But these are the periods during which the soft-liners are likely to find less support for…their goals….Why risk “achievements of the regime” for the sake of the fuzzy long-term advantages advocated by the SL?...Thus, these regimes lose their golden opportunity to liberalize under the conditions that would maximize their chances for exercising close and enduring control over the transition.” (17).
Context of transition
“The liberalization and eventual democratization of authoritarian regimes…involves…a crucial component of mobilization and organization of large numbers of individuals, thereby attenuating the role of external factors.” (18).
“…we assert that there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence…of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners.” (19).
“Nor can the timing of an opening toward liberalization be correlated predictably with the performance of authoritarian rulers in meeting socioeconomic goals. Both relative success and relative failure have characterized these moments.” (20).
“…authoritarian regimes that had been relatively successful and hence had encountered a less active and aggressive opposition opted for the transition with a higher degree of self-confidence.” (20) “…the regime-confident, self-initiated scenario differs from the opposition-induced one in two key respects: 1) the sequence, rhythm, and scope of liberalization and democratization tend to remain firmly in the control of incumbents…; and 2) the social and political forces which supported the authoritarian regime stand a better chance of playing a significant electoral and representational role in the subsequent regime.” (21).
During this process, they say: there is a “omnipresent fear” and the “possibility of a coup is not fictitious” (23).
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